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A COMPARISON OF THE USE OF CHARACTER WITNESS TESTI-
MONY IN MARYlAND VERSUS THE FEDERAL PRACTICE: DISTIN-
GUISHING REASONABLE BASIS FROM SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF 
CONDUCT AFTER JENSEN V. STATE, 355 MD. 692, 736 A.2D 
307 (1999) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The fundamental rule of character evidence is the "propensity 
rule," establishing a general prohibition against the use of character 
evidence to prove that a person acted in conformity with a specific 
character trait on a particular occasion. l When a witness testifies at 
trial, the credibility of that witness automatically becomes relevant, di-
rectly impinging on the propensity rule by raising the question 
whether that person testified in conformity with the character trait for 
truthfulness.2 Accordingly, Federal Rule of Evidence 608 ("Rule 
608")3 and Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-608 ("Maryland Rule 5-608")4 
1. See FED. R. EVlD. 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or trait of char-
acter is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion .... "). Accord MD. R. EVlD. 5404. Char-
acter evidence is defined as proof of general moral character or a specific 
character trait, such as honesty, carefulness, generosity, violence, sobriety, 
or truthfulness and other traits relevant to litigation. See 5 LYNN MCLAIN, 
MARYLAND PRACTICE § 404.1, at 338-39 (1987). 
2. See JOSEPH F. MuRPHY, MARYlAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 507(B) (3d ed. 
1999); EDWARD J. IMWlNKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 108 (3d ed. 
1995); James W. McElhaney, An Impeachment Checklist: Attacking the Witness's 
Credibility, 78 A.B.A. J. 62 (1992); see also State v. Duke, 123 A.2d 745, 746 
(N.H. 1956) ("No sufficient reason appears why the jury should not be in-
formed what sort of person is asking them to take his word. In transactions 
of everyday life this is probably the first thing that they would wish to 
know."). 
3. FED. R. EVID. 608. Federal Rule of Evidence 608, entitled Evidence of Char-
acter and Conduct of Witness, provides: 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility 
of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form 
of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the 
evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthful-
ness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after 
the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by 
opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct 
of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the wit-
127 
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carve out an exception to the propensity rule.5 
Rule 608 and Maryland Rule 5-608 govern the admissibility of char-
acter witness testimony used to impeach or rehabilitate a principal wit-
ness's specific trait for truthfulness or untruthfulness.6 Even though 
character evidence may be relevant proof as to whether a principal 
ness's credibility ... may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They 
may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truth-
fulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of 
the witness (1) concerning the witness's character for truthfulness 
or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness 
or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the wit-
ness being cross-examined has testified. 
FED. R. EVID. 608. 
4. MD. R. EVID. 5-608. Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-608, entitled Evidence of 
Character of Witness for Truthfulness or Untruthfulness, provides: 
(a) Impeachment and Rehabilitation by Character Witnesses. (1) 
Impeachment by a Character Witness. In order to attack the credi-
bility of a witness, a character witness may testify (A) that the wit-
ness has a reputation for untruthfulness, or (B) that, in the 
character witness's opinion, the witness is an untruthful person. 
(2) Rehabilitation by a Character Witness. After the character for 
truthfulness of a witness has been attacked, a character witness may 
testify (A) that the witness has a good reputation for truthfulness, 
or (B) that, in the character witness's opinion, the witness is a 
truthful person. 
Id. 
(3) Limitations on Character Witness's Testimony. (A) A character 
witness may not testify to an opinion as to whether a witness testi-
fied truthfully in the action. (B) On direct examination, a charac-
ter witness may give a reasonable basis for testimony as to 
reputation or an opinion as to the character of the witness for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, but may not testify to specific in-
stances of truthfulness or untruthfulness by the witness. 
(4) Impeachment of Character Witness. The court may permit a 
character witness to be cross-examined about specific instances in 
which a witness has been truthful or untruthful .... 
S. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (3); MD. R. EVID. 5-404(a)(I)(C); 3AJOHN HENRY 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 920, at 723 (John H. 
Chadborn ed., rev. 1970) (Professor Wigmore opined: "that which induces 
us to believe that a witness is or is not likely to be speaking truthfully is 
usually some circumstance of his actual personality."). 
6. A principal witness is defined as "a witness who has given substantive testi-
mony - thus, usually, a witness who has previously testified." LYNN MCLAiN, 
MARYlAND RULES OF EVIDENCE § 2.608.3, at 148 (1994). A character witness 
is defined as "both the reputation witness who testifies as to the accused 
person's community reputation and the opinion witness who testifies that 
in his opinion the accused possesses certain character traits." BLACK'S LAw 
DICTIONARY 1604 (6th ed. 1990). 
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witness is credible, extreme caution is required when admitting such 
given the dangers. 7 
Consequently, evidentiary rules operate to limit the use of evidence 
that can obstruct the truth.s Rule 608 and Maryland Rule 5-608 con-
tain various safeguards to limit the occurrences of the underlying dan-
gers to character evidence.9 It is undisputed that a character witness is 
strictly prohibited from testifying about specific acts of the principal 
witness's conduct on direct examination. Io Due to the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland recent holding in Jensen v. State,II however, testi-
mony about specific instances of a principal witness's conduct may be 
admissible if disguised as proper "reasonable basis" testimony.I2 
The purpose of this Comment is to demonstrate that the court of 
appeals went too far with its holding in Jensen. No longer is it clear in 
Maryland what separates a permissible "reasonable basis" from an im-
permissible "specific instance of conduct."13 This is especially trouble-
some because character evidence plays a significant role in the 
outcome of a trial,14 
7. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVI-
DENCE § 608.02[02] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2000); infra Part 
III.A. 
8. The Federal Rules of Evidence represent a compromise between supplying 
the trier of fact with relevant evidence used to estimate the truth, and ex-
cluding otherwise relevant evidence that in the long-term tends to obstruct 
the truth. See Federal Rule of Evidence 102 ("[T]hese rules shall be con-
strued to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable ex-
pense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of 
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly deter-
mined.") (emphasis added). See also Robert D. Okun, Character and Credibil-
ity: A Proposal to Realign Federal Rules of Evidence 608 and 609, 37 VILL. L. REv. 
533,534 (1992). Certain rules of evidence prohibit otherwise relevant evi-
dence because of the danger that the admission of the evidence may under-
mine the truth. Examples of this concept include the rules against hearsay, 
the best evidence rule, and in the instant case, the rules against propensity 
evidence. See id. 
9. See infra Part III.B. 
10. See infra Part III.B.3. 
11. 355 Md. 692, 736 A.2d 307 (1999). 
12. See infra Part III.C.2.a.; note 275 and accompanying text. 
13. Compare infra Part III.C.2.a. with Part III.C.2.b 
14. See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 8.3, at 
408 (3d ed. 1996); see also Fred Warren Bennett, Is the Witness Believable? A 
New Look at Truth and Veracity Character Evidence and Bad Acts Relevant to 
Truthfulness in a Criminal Case, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 569, 602 (1997) (recog-
nizing that in a criminal trial the verdict is based on who the jury believes, 
therefore, the credibility of witnesses is critical to guilt or innocence); 
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Part II of this Comment discusses the evolution of using character 
witness testimony from common law to the adoption of Rule 608,15 
other jurisdictions' rules on character evidence,I6 and Maryland Rule 
5-608. 17 Part III outlines the dangers underlying character evidence 
and explains the limitations imposed to restrict the use of character 
witness testimony. IS This section focuses on the foundational require-
ments for admitting character evidence by comparing the federal 
practice to the Maryland practice. I9 Part IV describes the difficulty 
and importance of distinguishing reasonable basis testimony from spe-
cific instances of conduct, and scrutinizes the court's holding in Jen-
sen. 20 Finally, this Comment concludes by recommending that 
Maryland adopt a more restrictive approach to the use of character 
witness testimony.21 
II. THE HISTORY OF ALLOWING A CHARACTER WITNESS TO 
TESTIFY TO THE TRUTHFULNESS OR UNTRUTHFULNESS 
OF A PRINCIPAL WITNESS 
A. Proving Character at Common Law: Limiting the Methods of Proof 
At common law, a witness's character for truthfulness was always rel-
evant, causing evidence of that trait to be admissible.22 Prior to the 
1700s, a character witness could testify to an opinion of the principal 
witness's general character supported by testimony of specific in-
stances of conduct.23 By the 1800s, a character witness could still tes-
tify in the form of an opinion, but was limited to the principal 
witness's character for truthfulness, and prohibited from testifYing to 
specific instances of conduct.24 
THOMAS A. MAULT & WARREN D. WOLFSON, TRIAL EVIDENCE § 2.1, at 9 
(1997); David P. Leonard, Appellate Review of Evidentiary Rulings, 70 N.C. L. 
REv. 1155, 1172 (1992). 
15. See infra Part II.A & B. 
16. See infra Part II.C. 
17. See infra Part II.D. 
18. See infra Part III.A & B. 
19. See infra Part III.C .. 
20. See infra Part IV. 
21. See infra notes 326-32 and accompanying text. 
22. See 3A WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 922, at 726. 
23. Id. § 923, at 728. 
24. Id. The past use of general character testimony influenced the form of in-
quiry. The question asked was "knowing [the principal witness's] general 
character, would you believe him under oath?" Id. The character witness 
was limited to testifying about veracity, but could base an opinion on knowl-
edge of the principal witness's general character. See id. 
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Over time, character evidence was further limited by prohibiting 
the use of opinion testimony, but permitting the use of reputation 
testimony about the principal witness's character for truthfulness.25 
Opinion testimony was prohibited based on the fear that it generated 
extraneous issues about specific conduct of the principal witness.26 
This common-law practice was the backdrop for the codification of 
formal rules of evidence, and still provides a source of guidance for 
identifying problems and suggesting solutions to evidentiary issues.27 
B. Adopting Rule 608: Permitting Opinion and Reputation Testimony 
There was some debate over whether to adopt formal rules of evi-
dence. Proponents of codification found utility in formal rules to im-
prove the quality of judges and attorneys,28 to promote uniformity 
and predictability in the application of evidentiary rules,29 and to in-
crease the amount of admissible evidence based on a case-by-case ex-
ercise of judicial discretion leading to better admissibility 
determinations. 30 Conversely, opponents disregarded the "quality of 
judges and attorneys" argument,31 found error in the reasoning that 
uniformity and predictability could be achieved through formal 
rules,32 and proffered that increased admissibility and enhanced judi-
25. Id. § 922, at 726. 
26. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 43, at 156-57 Gohn William Strong et al. eds., 
4th ed. 1992). When a character witness expresses an opinion, side issues 
are provoked because the character witness may be cross-examined about 
the grounds for the opinion. Id. 
27. See Edward W. Cleary, Introduction to FED. R. EVID., at V. (West eds., 1999). 
28. See Margaret Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the 
Goals of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 255, 258 n.21 (1984) (citing Ste-
phen A Saltzburg, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Continuing Education 
of judges and Lawyers, 5 VA. L. SCH. REp. 6 (1981) and Stephen A Saltzburg, 
The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Quality of Practice in Federal Courts, 27 
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 173 (1978». 
29. Id. at 259 n.22 (citing Gradl F. Tollison,Jr., A Plea for Adoption of the Missis-
sippi Rules of Evidence, 53 MISS. LJ. 49 (1983) and Thomas F. Green, A Pre-
liminary Report on the Admissibility and Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of 
Evidencefor the United States District Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73,109-10 (1962». 
30. Id. at 259 n.23 (citing JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A BERGER, WEIN-
STEIN'S EVIDENCE T-2, at iii-iv (1982); Jack B. Weinstein, The Ohio and Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 6 CAP. U.L. REv. 517 (1977); Paul F. Rothstein, Some Themes 
in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 FED. BJ. 21, 29 (1974». 
31. Id. at 259 n.24 (citing John H. Wigmore, The American Law Inst. Code of 
Evidence Rules. A Dissent, 28 ABA J. 23, 24 (1942». 
32. Id. at 259 n.25 (citingJoHN H. WIGMORE, CODE OF EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1942». 
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cial discretion does not lead to better admissibility determinations.33 
Despite such resistance, in 1965, an advisory committee was formed to 
draft the Federal Rules of Evidence.34 What eventually became Rule 
608 was the subject of debate among the drafters and Congress con-
cerning the proper balance between the value and dangers of charac-
ter witness testimony.35 A major issue was the admissibility of opinion 
character evidence. 
In 1969, the preliminary draft of Rule 608 expressly permitted opin-
ion testimony but excluded reputation testimony.36 This was a com-
plete reversal from the pre-rules practice.37 In response, the revised 
draft permitted both opinion and reputation testimony.38 In addi-
tion, a higher level of probative value was required for the admission 
of specific instances of conduct evidence on cross-examination.39 This 
change represented a heightened awareness of the prejudicial effect 
of admitting specific instances.4o Finally, greater restrictions were 
placed on the admissibility of character evidence by requiring that evi-
dence be" 'clearly probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness and not 
remote in time."'41 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) responded to the Revised Draft 
by protesting that the heightened standard for admissibility of charac-
ter evidence was too demanding.42 The DOJ also opposed the admis-
sibility of opinion evidence arguing it would cause distracting and 
time-consuming direct examinations concerning specific acts that 
were the basis for the opinion testimony.43 
In consideration of the DOl's concerns, the Judicial Conference 
Draft of Rule 608 relaxed the standard of admissibility44 and added a 
33. Berger, supra note 28, at 259 n.26 (citing J. Clay Smith, Codification of the 
Rules of Evidence: An Unreadiness, 33 FED. BJ. 44 (1974». 
34. See Cleary, supra note 27, at III. 
35. 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VIGrOR JAMES GoLD, FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 6111, at 8 (1993). 
36. 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 
§ 260, at 135 (2d ed. 1994) (citing 46 F.R.D. 161,292-95 (1969». 
37. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
38. 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6111, at 11-13. 
39. 28 id. at 13. 
40. 28 id. 
41. 28 id. at 14. 
42. 28 id. (arguing the "clearly probative ... and not remote in time" require-
ments were too stringent). 
43. 28 id. at 17. 
44. 28 id. at 17 (retaining the "and not remote in time" language but deleting 
the word "clearly" from the clearly probative standard). 
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cross-reference to the Advisory Committee's Note for Rule 405.45 The 
Supreme Court Draft made no changes to the Judicial Conference 
Draft.46 Throughout the drafting process of Rule 608, however, objec-
tions were voiced and renewed against the admissibility of opinion 
evidence.47 
The Second Committee Print prohibited the use of opinion evi-
dence, and instead favored the common-law practice of permitting 
only reputation evidence.48 This committee action was challenged 
during floor debate where an amendment proposing the reinstate-
ment of opinion evidence as a permissible method of proving charac-
ter was passed.49 Both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives 
agreed to a final draft, and the current version of Rule 608 was en-
acted in 1975.50 Subsequently, Rule 608 served as a model for the 
codification of state rules of evidence on character witness 
testimony.51 
45. 28 id. at 18. The Advisory Committee's note explained that opinion testi-
mony regarding a person's character ought to be limited to "the nature and 
extent of observation and acquaintance upon which the opinion is based.» 
FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee's note. 
46. See 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6111, at 20-21. 
47. 28 id.at 18-20. A series of letters were exchanged between the DOJ, the 
Attorney General, and the drafters of Rule 608 over the concern of admit-
ting opinion testimony. 28 id. at 18-20 nn.27-29. 
48. 28 id. at 24 (acknowledging that the Judiciary Committee concurred in this 
action to restrict the method of proof to the common-law practice). 
49. See 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6111, at 25 (restoring the language 
proposed by the Advisory Committee). 
50. 28 id. 
51. 28 id. at 27. A general overview of the effects of the codification of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence reveals a transformation in the process of eviden-
tiary decision making. See generally Berger, supra note 28. 
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C. Other jurisdictions' Rules on Character Evidena[>2 
A majority of jurisdictions followed the federal practice and 
adopted Rule 608(a) and (b) verbatim. 53 Some jurisdictions adopted 
rules consistent with Rule 608, but made minor changes in word 
choice54 or added provisions to clarify the federal rule. 55 
The added provision limited the use of character evidence.56 For 
example, some jurisdictions permitted character evidence only in the 
form of reputation testimony, 57 while other jurisdictions expressly and 
categorically prohibited the use of specific instances of conduct, even 
52. The extent of this particular comparison centered around the text of the 
evidentiary rules on character witnesses. No research or analysis was com-
pleted as to the judicial application of other jurisdictions' rules. The fol-
lowing acknowledgement is relevant, that "[iJ t is important . . . not to 
conclude that similar, or even identical, language will receive the same in-
terpretation in one jurisdiction as it has in another." Alan D. Hornstein, 
The New Maryland Rules of Evidence: Survey, Analysis and Critique, 54 MD. L. 
REv. 1032, 1034 (1995). Other commentators have undertaken an analysis 
of state rules of character evidence. See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, 
supra note 36, § 260, at 140 nn.20-23; 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 35, 
§ 6111, at 27-28 nn.49-51. 
53. ALA. R EVID. 608; ARIZ. R EVID. 608; ARK. R EVID. 608; COLO. R EVID. 608; 
IDAHO R EVID. 608; IND. R EVID. 608; IOWA R EVID. 608; MICH. R EVID. 
608; MINN. R EVID. 608; MISS. R EVID. 608; NEB. R EVID. 608; N.H. R EVID. 
608; N.M. R EVID. 11-608; N.C. R EVIO. 608; N.D. R. EVID. 608; OHIO R 
EVID. 608; OKLA. R. EVID. 2608; RI. R EVID. 608; S.D. R EVID. 19-14-9; VT. 
R EVIO. 608; W.VA. R EVID. 608; WYO. R EVID. 608. 
54. CONN. R EVID. 6-6; HAw. R EVID. 608; MONT. R EVID. 608; WIS. R EVID. 
906.08. 
55. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. 
56. ALA. R EVID. 608 (adding subsection (c) that requires judicial balancing of 
probative value and prejudicial effect before allowing specific instances of 
conduct on cross examination); Ky. R EVID. 608 (permitting opinion and 
reputation testimony limited to general reputation, but no mention of spe-
cific instances of conduct); NEV. REv. STAT. 50.085 (1996) (permitting opin-
ion testimony but prohibiting reputation testimony); S.C. R EVID. 608 
(adding subsection (c) that permits evidence of bias to impeach witness); 
TENN. R EVID. 608 (adding subsections that require judicial determination 
of probative value and reasonable basis before inquiry of specific instances 
of conduct on cross examination); UTAH R EVID. 608 (adding subsection 
(c) that permits evidence of bias or prejudice to impeach witness). 
57. DEL. R EVID. 608; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.609 (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 24-9-84 (1995); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 608 (West 1995); ME. R EVID. 
608; MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 21A (West 2000); PA. R EVID. 608; 
WASH. R EVID. 608. 
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if on cross-examination and probative of truthfulness. 58 In the later 
instance, by disallowing specific instances of conduct, these jurisdic-
tions alleviated some of the dangers that accompany proof of 
character. 59 
D. Maryland Rule 5-608: An Adaptation of Federal Rule 608 
In Maryland, prior to the adoption of formal rules, the body of evi-
dence law was contained in the Maryland Reports and Maryland 
Code.60 The scope and use of character witnesses were governed by 
Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, section 9-
115.61 Shortly after section 9-115 was enacted, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland commented that section 9-115 "made a drastic change in 
the substantive law" by abrogating the common law to allow both per-
sonal opinion and reputation evidence,62 and the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland interpreted section 9-115 as "the common law rule 
with a vastly broadened field of vision."63 
In 1977, Maryland began the process of adopting formal rules of 
evidence modeled after the Federal Rules.64 This attempt was re-
jected by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, who opted to allow more 
time for the newly codified Federal Rules of Evidence to settle.65 
While waiting for the Federal Rules to settle, the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland held in Hemingway v. State,66 that a character wit-
ness should be permitted to give an opinion of a principal witness's 
violent character and the basis for that opinion, even if the testimony 
constitutes a specific instance of conduct.67 This holding was signifi-
cant as it departed from the Federal Rules, common law, and statutory 
58. CAL. EVlD. CODE §§ 786-87 (West 1995); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 608 (West 1994); 
OR. EVlD. CODE 608; TEX. R. EVlD. 608. 
59. See infra Part II.A.; note 125 and accompanying test. 
60. See Hornstein, supra note 52, at 1034. 
61. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-115 (1974). This section stated: 
[d. 
Where character evidence is otheIWise relevant to the proceeding, 
no person offered as a character witness who has an adequate basis 
for forming an opinion as to another person's character shall here-
after be excluded from giving evidence based on personal opinion 
to prove character, either in person or by deposition, in any suit, 
action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in any court or before any 
judge, or jury of the State. 
62. Taylor v. State, 278 Md. 150, 155,360 A.2d 430, 433-34 (1976). 
63. Nishchuk v. State, 32 Md. App. 403, 407, 362 A.2d 91,94 (1976). 
64. Hornstein, supra note 52, at 1033. 
65. See id. 
66. 76 Md. App. 127,543 A.2d 879 (1988). 
67. [d. at 136-37, 543 A.2d at 883. 
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practice that prohibited character witnesses from testifYing about spe-
cific instances of conduct on direct examination.68 
In Hemingway, Eric Dwayne Hemingway was convicted of man-
slaughter for the shooting death of Randall Hickman.69 There was 
conflicting evidence presented as to the events leading up to the 
shooting.7o Hemingway testified that Hickman and his party were the 
initial aggressors, and, fearing an imminent attack, Hemingway 
reached for his gun.71 Hemingway claimed he panicked when Hick-
man attacked him, causing him to shoot and kill Hickman.72 The de-
fense called retired Officer Phillip Lance as a character witness to 
testify that Hickman had a reputation for violence.73 Lance gave his 
opinion that Hickman was a very violent person based upon two inves-
tigations of prior crimes committed by Hickman.74 The trial court 
determined, out of the presence of the jury, that Lance's investiga-
tions of Hickman supported a reasonable basis for his opinion.75 The 
trial court, however, limited Lance to testifying that he was well-ac-
quainted with Hickman, and that in Lance's opinion, Hickman was a 
violent person.76 Hemingway appealed this decision. 77 
68. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-115 advisory committee's note 
(discussing modification of the common-law practice that prohibited testi-
mony by character witness regarding specific acts); see also supra Part II.A. 
and II.B. 
69. Hemingway, 76 Md. App. at 129-30, 543 A.2d at 880. 
70. Id. at 130-31, 543 A.2d at 880. The confrontation between Hemingway and 
Hickman took place at a gas station parking lot. Id. Mary Louise Johnson, 
Susie Murphy and Anthony Vernon arrived first at the scene and were wait-
ing for Hemingway when they were approached by Randall Hickman, Steve 
Hickman and Randy Mullins. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 131, 543 A.2d at 880. Hemingway's testimony generated the issue of 
self-defense. Id. at 132-33, 543 A.2d at 881-82. The court of appeals ex-
plained that when self-defense is raised, character evidence of the victim as 
a violent person is admissible to corroborate evidence that the victim was 
the initial aggressor. [d. The admissibility of opinion evidence regarding 
the victim's character trait of violence is governed by section 9-115. Id. at 
133-34, 543 A.2d at 881-82; see also MD. R. EVID. 5-404 (permitting the ad-
missibility of character evidence where a defendant in a homicide trial 
claims that the victim was the first aggressor, since the victim's character 
trait of violence becomes relevant and admissible). 
73. Hemingway, 76 Md. App. at 131, 543 A.2d at 880-8l. 
74. Id. at 132, 543 A.2d at 881 (citing Lance's involvement in Hickman's convic-
tion for manslaughter in 1979, and an unexecuted warrant for Hickman's 
arrest based upon a charge of malicious wounding in 1981). 
75. Id. at 131-32, 543 A.2d at 880-81. 
76. Id. at 132, 543 A.2d at 881. 
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On appeal, the court of special appeals analyzed the admissibility of 
the opinion evidence by interpreting section 9_115.78 The court held 
that on remand, during direct examination, Lance could give his 
opinion of Hickman's violent character and support this opinion with 
details of the 1978 and 1981 criminal investigations of Hickman.79 
At the same time the court decided Hemingway, Maryland under-
took the project of adopting state rules of evidence.8o A subcommit-
tee was created to draft proposed rules of evidence for consideration 
by the Rules Committee for Practice and Procedure and present them 
before the Court of Appeals of Maryland.81 In 1994, the Maryland 
Rules of Evidence became effective, codified as Title 5 of the Mary-
land Rules of Procedure. Title 5 was based substantially on the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.82 In addition, through the promulgation of 
Maryland Rule 5-608, the drafters of the Maryland Rules of Evidence 
expressly overruled Hemingway.83 
III. RESTRICTING THE USE OF CHARACTER WITNESS TESTI-
MONY: APPLICATION OF RULE 608 AND MARYLAND RULE 
5-608 
Under Rule 608 and Maryland Rule 5-608, character evidence fo-
cuses on the credibility of the individual witness, rather than setting 
forth reasons why specific testimony in the case should or should not 
be believed.84 Despite the content of the principal witness's testi-
mony, it is the principal witness's character for veracity that is the sub-
ject of a character witness's testimony.85 
77. [d. at 130, 543 A.2d at 880. 
78. [d. at 133-35, 543 A.2d at 882. 
79. [d. at 135-36, 543 A.2d at 882-83 ("No longer is a character witness pre-
vented from speaking of specific acts or precluded from demonstrating a 
basis of knowledge leading to his own independent opinion."). 
80. See Hornstein, supra note 52, at 1033. 
81. See id. 
82. See MCLAIN, supra note 6, at VII. 
83. MCLAIN, supra note 6, § 2.608.4, at 149. This subsection abrogated the for-
mer Maryland practice that allowed a character witness to testify on direct 
examination about specific acts of truthfulness of the principal witness. [d. 
84. See 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6113, at 43. 
85. See United States v. Malady, 960 F.2d 57, 58 (8th Cir. 1992) (preventing a 
character witness from being asked whether he believed the testimony of a 
principal witness); see also 3 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 36, § 6.38, 
at 813 (declaring that the proper question of a character witness is not 
whether a particular statement is true, but whether the principal witness is a 
truthful person); MuRPHY, supra note 2, § 1302(A), at 494 (stating that, in 
Maryland, an impeaching witness can state whether he would believe the 
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The probative value of character evidence is measured by the 
weight of its effect on the trier of fact's perception of the principal 
witness's credibility.86 Some commentators have raised doubts regard-
ing the probative value of character evidence.87 Psychological re-
search suggests that evidence of the principal witness's character trait 
for truthfulness may be less probative than the witness's response to 
contextual factors, such as the courtroom and witness stand.88 Addi-
tional scientific research concludes that there may be no single identi-
fiable character trait indicative of truthfulness.89 These theories 
undermine the basic premise upon which the probative value of char-
acter evidence rests-how one acts in one situation is determinative of 
how he or she will act in another situation.90 Accordingly, the debate 
over probative value lends itself to a restrictive rule of evidence. 
The court's role when determining the admissibility of character 
evidence is to promote "accurate fact-finding, protect witnesses from 
testimony of the other witness); 6 MCLAIN, supra note 1, § 608.2, at 71 (stat-
ing a character witness in Maryland may testify that she would not believe 
the principal witness under oath). 
86. See Richard D. Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [!?J 
Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 V.C.L.A. L. REv. 637, 655 (1991). The 
probative value of evidence is determined "by comparing how probable 
[the] proposition appeared before the evidence was presented with how 
probable it appears afterwards." Id. 
87. The California Law Revision Commission in rejecting Uniform Rule 47 
opined: 
Character evidence is of slight probative value and may be very 
prejudicial. It tends to distract the trier of fact from the main ques-
tion of what actually happened on the particular occasion. It subtly 
permits the trier of fact to reward the good man and to punish the 
bad man because of their respecti~e characters despite what the 
evidence in the case shows actually happened. 
FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note (quoting Tentative Recommen-
dation and a Study Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence: Art. VI Ex-
trinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility and Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, 
Rep., Rec. & Studies, 615 (1964)); see also infra Part III.A. 
88. See Friedman, supra note 86, at 64M7 (discussing situationist theories). 
89. See Okun, supra note 8, at 547-48. A five-year study, subjecting over 11,000 
children to situations where the trait of honesty was implicated, found that 
the children did not exhibit a "unified character trait for honesty." Id. 
90. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. These theories must be addressed 
in conjunction with the considerations that lying is a "particularly difficult 
type of behavior to study." Friedman, supra note 86, at 652. It is also very 
difficult to simulate the jury decision-making process. Okun, supra note 8, 
at 559 (acknowledging that most empirical studies are performed under 
situations dramatically different from actual jury deliberations). 
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harassment, and eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay."91 Con-
versely, the dangers underlying character evidence are: (1) erosion of 
accurate fact-finding; (2) witness harassment; and (3) delay of the 
trial. 
A. The Underlying Dangers 
1. Prejudicial Impact Erodes Accurate Fact-Finding 
Character evidence can erode accurate fact-finding because of the 
tendency of juries to accord it too much weight despite its "dubious" 
probative value.92 One of the dangers of admitting character evi-
dence is the creation of collateral issues that distract the jury.93 For 
example, a juror may form an image of a principal witness based on 
evidence conveying minimal information that is noteworthy or unu-
sual.94 "When the character evidence is seemingly more interesting 
than the material facts, the jury may get bogged down in collateral 
issues and minor points that bear no specific link to the facts or par-
ties in the case.95 
Character evidence can also undermine the jury's decision-making 
process through its prejudicial effects. For example, if the character 
witness is permitted to testifY about conduct of the principal witness 
that is morally reprehensible, then the jury may associate the principal 
witness with the party who called the witness and, therefore, be in-
clined to punish that party.96 Some psychologists believe that charac-
ter evidence can be especially interesting to jurors who have been 
taught the importance of truthfulness since childhood.97 
91. 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6112, at 32. 
92. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 7, § 608.02[2] (warning "despite its 
somewhat dubious probative value, the character evidence may have an 
overwhelming impact"); see also 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6112. 
93. See 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6112. Collateral issues are ques-
tions or issues not directly involved with the matter in question. See BLACK'S 
LAw DICTIONARY 835 (7th ed. 1999). 
94. Okun, supra note 8, at 550. 
95. 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6112, at 34 n.9. The author cited 
Kerper & MacDonald, Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b): A Proposed Revision, 22 
AKRON L. REv. 283, 291 (1989), which explained that other modes of im-
peachment focus on the present, whereas character impeachment focuses 
on the past creating additional links in the chain of inferences. 
96. Okun, supra note 8, at 550 n.77. The author cited Custar Ichheiser, Misun-
derstandings in Human Relations: A Study in False Social Perceptions, 55 AM. J. 
Soc. 1, 28 (1949), which stated that "we have the tendency to consider a 
partial structure of personality which happens to be visible to us as if this 
partial structure were the total personality 'itself.''' 
97. 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6113, at 42 n.12. 
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2. Witness Harassment 
A principal witness, who is not the accused, is not on trial and can 
be found guilty of nothing.98 Overly broad character evidence creates 
an atmosphere of hostility for the principal witness.99 Professor Wig-
more stated that common decency called for limits on character evi-
dence: "[The] ruthless flaying of personal character in the witness box 
is not only cowardly-because there is no escape for the victim-and 
brutal-because it inflicts the pain of public exposure of misdeeds to 
idle bystanders-but it has often not the slightest justification of ne-
cessity."lOo The threat of overly broad character evidence makes com-
ing forward and testifying significantly less palatable for witnesses. lOI 
3. Delay of the Trial 
Allowing a character witness wide latitude in testifying about the 
principal witness's character trait for veracity may dissolve a case into a 
series of mini-trials, exposing the character and life history of a princi-
pal witness. 102 Consequently, this excursion prolongs the length of 
the trial. Mter a character witness is brought forward to impeach a 
principal witness, the sponsoring party may call a second character 
witness to impeach the first character witness. 103 This stacking of 
character witnesses drowns the material issues of the case in a sea of 
witness testimony. 104 
B. Preventing the Underlying Dangers: Limitations on Character Witness 
Testimony 
Other rules of evidence, incidental to Rule 608 and Maryland Rule 
5-608, operate to limit occurrences of the underlying dangers. For 
98. 3A WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 921, at 724. 
99. 3A id. ("[W]ithout any charge and without any trial, [the witness] may be 
condemned by public opinion and disgraced before the community."). 
100. 3A id. at 84l. 
101. 3A see id. (resulting in the deprivation of justice to fully obtain useful 
testimony) . 
102. See 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6112. 
103. See 3A WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 894, at 658 (noting that when "B is brought 
forward to impeach A, and C to impeach B, it is obvious that not only might 
there be no end to this process, but the real issues of the case might be 
wholly lost sight of in the mass of testimony .... "). 
104. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 480 (1948) (recognizing that 
in the "frontier phase of the law's development, calling friends to vouch for 
good character and its counterpart-calling the rivals and enemies of a wit-
ness to impeach [the witness] ... were favorite and frequent ways of con-
verting an individual litigation into a community contest and a trial into a 
spectacle.") . 
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example, Rule 403105 gives the trial court discretion to exclude rele-
vant evidence where the harm likely to result from its admis~ion sub-
stantially outweighs the probative value of, and the need for, the 
evidence.106 Similarly, Rule 611 107 grants the trial court power to re-
ject cumulative or irrelevant testimonyl08 and to exclude harassing 
forms of evidence.109 
Most importantly, Rule 608 and Maryland Rule 5-608 contain inter-
nal safeguards. When offering character evidence pursuant to these 
rules, the character witness is limited to testifying: (1) for impeach-
ment or rehabilitation purposes only after the principal witness has 
testified; (2) about the principal witness's specific trait of truthfulness 
or untruthfulness; and (3) in the form of an opinion or reputation. 
105. FED. R. EVlD. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of un-
due delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence."). Accard MD. R. EVlD. 5-403. Rule 403 is the most commonly cited 
Federal Rule of Evidence in cases determining the admissibility of impeach-
ment evidence, while Maryland Rule 5-403 has been designated as "the all-
important 'clean-up batter' of evidence." Hornstein, supra note 52, at 1036; 
5 MCLAIN, supra note 1, § 403.1, at 552. 
106. FED. R. EVlD. 608 advisory comrriittee's note ("[TJhe overriding protection 
of Rule 403 requires that probative value not be outweighed by danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury .... "); see also 
United States v. Saunders, 166 F.3d 907, 920 (7th Cir. 1999) (recognizing 
that the probative value of character evidence for truthfulness must "out-
weigh the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the 
jury"); United States v. Bedonie, 913 F.2d 782, 801-02 (10th Cir. 1990) (in-
voking Rule 403 where the probative value of reputation character evidence 
was outweighed by potential prejudice); United States v. Leake, 642 F.2d 
715,718-19 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting that the trial court has discretion when 
applying Rule 608 to ensure the overriding safeguards of Rules 403 and 611 
are fulfilled). 
107. FED. R. EVlD. 611 (a) ("The court shall exercise reasonable control over the 
mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to 
(1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertain-
ment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect 
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment."). Accard MD. R. 
EVlD.5-611(a). 
108. See Ceders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976) (citing Hamling v. 
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 127 (1974) and County of Mason v. Shores, 97 
U.S. 272 (1877)). 
109. See United States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 956 (4th Cir. 1994) (upholding 
the trial court's decision to prevent counsel from cross-examining a witness 
regarding his sexual life because it was not probative of truthfulness and 
would constitute harassment). 
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1. Procedural Safeguards 
Because it is presumed that all persons are truthful, the use of char-
acter evidence to prove truthfulness is only admissible after a charac-
ter attack has been waged. IlO According to Rule 608 and Maryland 
Rule 5-608, the sponsoring party cannot bolster the principal witness's 
credibility for truthfulness through the use of a character witness prior 
to an attempt to impeach by the adverse party. I 11 Absent any attack 
on the principal witness's credibility, the presumption remains intact 
that the principal witness is a truthful person. II2 
Under Rule 608 and Maryland Rule 5-608, all witnesses are im-
peachable once they testify.ll3 For example, if a criminal defendant 
testifies, the prosecution may offer a character witness to testify about 
the defendant's character for untruthfulness. 1l4 Once impeached, 
the defense may offer a character witness to rehabilitate the criminal 
defendant's credibility.II5 
2. Only the Specific Trait for Truthfulness is Relevant 
The use of general character evidence increases the likelihood of 
error and prejudice against the principal witness.u6 As a result, Rule 
608 and Maryland Rule 5-608 prohibit testimony about the general 
character of the principal witness, but permit testimony about the 
110. See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1104, at 233-34; MuRPHY, supra note 2, 
§ 507(B), at 189-90. 
111. See FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (2); MD. R. EVID. 5-608(a)(2); seeal50United States 
v. Taylor, 900 F.2d 779, 782 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that it was improper 
for the government to offer a police officer as a character witness to bolster 
the credibility of an informant, who testified as a principal witness, before 
the informant's credibility was attacked); United States v. Hicks, 748 F.2d 
854,859 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting that the sponsoring party could not ques-
tion the principal witness on direct examination about the absence of a 
prior criminal record because such an action bolstered the credibility of 
the witness before the witness's truthfulness had been established). But see 
United States v. Schatzle, 901 F.2d 252, 255-56 (2d Cir. 1990) (ruling that 
the sponsoring party could question the principal witness on direct exami-
nation regarding a failure to list an arrest on a bar application because it 
was a permissible line of questioning by the opposing party, thus, present-
ing the fact in the least damaging light possible). 
112. 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6116, at 66 n.4. 
113. FED. R. EVID. 608; MD. R. EVID. 5-608. Neither rule distinguishes between a 
party who testifies and a non-party who testifies. 
114. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 7, § 608.22[2][c][iii], at 608-61 (citing 
United States v. Goodson, 155 F.3d 963, 968 (8th Cir. 1998)). 
115. [d. 
116. See 3A WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 923, at 728. 
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principal witness's character for veracityY7 The distinction between 
veracity and general character relates to the breadth of the testimony 
about the principal witness's pertinent trait. llS For example, veracity 
limits the scope of examination to the specific trait for truthfulness,119 
while general character broadens the scope to include any of the prin-
cipal witness's character traits. 120 By restricting character witness testi-
mony to truthfulness, the goals are to sharpen relevancy, to reduce 
surprise, time, and confusion, and to make the witness's role some-
what more attractive. 121 
3. Limited Methods of Proof 
The method of proving character evidence plays a large part in an-
ticipating where potential abuses may arise. 122 Generally, evidence of 
pertinent character traits may be presented through testimony in the 
form of an opinion, reputation, and specific instances of conduct. 123 
Of the three methods, opinion and reputation evidence are the most 
common forms of admissible character evidence, while evidence of 
specific instances of conduct possesses the greatest capacity to arouse 
prejudice, to confuse, to surprise, and to consume time.124 The previ-
117. FED. R EVlD. 608 advisory committee's note. "In accordance with the bulk 
of judicial authority, the inquiry is strictly limited to character for veracity, 
rather than allowing evidence as to character generally." 56 F.RD. 183, 
267-68 (1973); accord MD. R EVlD. 5-608. See also United States v. Greer, 643 
F.2d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding no error in sustaining objection to 
question asked to character witness about principal witness's general repu-
tation because it was not properly limited to the trait for truthfulness). 
118. See 3A WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 922, at 727. 
119. 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6112, at 35. 
120. 3A WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 922, at 727. 
121. See FED. R EVlD. 608 advisory committee's note; 56 F.RD. 183, at 268 (cit-
ing CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVlDENCE, § 44 
(1954)). 
122. See generally Leonard, supra note 14, at 1164-76 (discussing the safeguards in 
Federal Rule 608 regarding specific instances). 
123. FED. R EVlD. 405. The methods of proving character are: 
(a) Reputation or Opinion. In all cases in which evidence of char-
acter or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be 
made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of 
an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into rele-
vant specific instances of conduct. (b) Specific Instances of Con-
duct. In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person 
is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may 
also be made of specific instances of that person's conduct. 
Id.; accord MD. R EVlD. 5-405. 
124. See FED. R EVlD. 405 advisory committee's note; 56 F.RD. 183,222 (1973). 
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ously discussed underlying dangers of character evidence are most ap-
parent when a character witness testifies about a specific instance of 
the principal witness's conduct. 125 Consistent with the goal oflimiting 
underlying dangers, Rule 608 and Maryland Rule 5-608 permit only 
reputation or opinion testimony as the methods of proving veracity to 
impeach or rehabilitate the credibility of a witness.126 
Generally, both Rule 608(b) and Maryland Rule 5-608(b), prohibit 
a character witness from testifying to specific instances of the principal 
witness's conduct on direct examination.127 Rule 608(b) provides that 
when attacking or supporting a witness's credibility, specific instances 
of conduct "may not be proved by extrinsic evidence."128 Similarly, 
Maryland Rule 5-608 (a) (3) (B) expressly states that a character witness 
"may not testify to specific instances of truthfulness or untruthfulness 
by the witness."129 In contrast, on cross-examination, opposing coun-
125. See supra Part III.A. Testimony of specific acts leads to the presentation of 
irrelevant evidence used to prove whether some specific act, committed by 
a principal witness, occurred. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 7, 
§ 608.21 (citing FED. R. EVID. 608(b)). When specific acts of a principal 
witness are improperly presented before the jury, it may have an enormous 
prejudicial impact. See Paul W. Grimm, Impeachment and Rehabilitation Under 
the Maryland Rules of Evidence: An Attorney's Guide, 24 U. Balt. L. Rev. 95, 102 
(noting that "proof of character trait by specific acts evidence is 'most likely 
to create prejudice and hostility'"(quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK's HAND-
BOOK ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 33, at 66 (2d ed. 1972))). Finally, allowing 
testimony about specific instances of conduct causes witness harassment 
and forces a witness to be prepared to defend any prior bad acts. See JOHN 
H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 78 (4th ed. 1970); 
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 7, §§ 608.01[3], 611.01 [l](a); GLEN WEIS-
SENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 608.9,611.2 (2d ed. 1995). 
126. See generally FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (3); MD. R. EVID. 5-404(a)(1)(C). 
127. FED R. EVID. 608(b); MD. R. EVID. 5-608 (a) (3)(B). 
128. FED R. EVID. 608(b) (indicating that, on direct examination, character wit-
ness testimony relating to specific conduct of a principal witness constitutes 
extrinsic evidence); see also United States v. Hoskins, 628 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 
1980). In Hoskins, a federal officer testified that he was struck by the defen-
dant. Id. at 296. The defense put forward a character witness to testify that 
the officer was untruthful. Id. at 297. The trial court prohibited the char-
acter witness from testifying to specific examples of the officer's dishonesty. 
Id. The court of appeals held that the trial court correctly refused extrinsic 
evidence of specific acts to support the opinion of the character witness. Id. 
at 296-97. In limited instances the rules of evidence permit extrinsic evi-
dence of specific acts on direct examination of a witness. See FED. R. EVID. 
609 (a) (2) ("[E]vidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall 
be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement .... "); see also Ben-
nett, supra note 14, at 581. 
129. MD. R. EVID. 5-608 (a) (3)(B). 
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sel may question a character witness about specific acts of the princi-
pal witness's conduct in limited situations to impeach the character 
witness's knowledge of the principal witness, the trustworthiness and 
accuracy of the character witness's knowledge, the basis for the char-
acter witness's opinion, and the character witness's candor and credi-
bility.130 A character witness may also be questioned as to specific acts 
of his or her own conduct that would be probative of truthfulness or 
untruthfulness. 131 
At common law, a character witness could only testify about the 
principal witness's reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness.132 
Although subjected to considerable debate, the formal rules of evi-
dence broadened the scope of character witness testimony to allow 
opinion evidence. 133 Admitting both forms of character evidence 
swept away the "artificial distinction between reputation and opinion," 
because at common law, a witness describing an untruthful reputation 
was actually "giving disguised opinion testimony."134 As one commen-
tator described, "Now 'reputation witnesses' can also give their per-
sonal opinions about the honesty of the principal witness - which is 
what they were really doing all along. The underlying idea is still the 
same."135 
Opinion evidence may be a more effective form of proof than repu-
tation evidence because a jury is likely to give more weight to a charac-
ter witness's personal endorsement of another witness as opposed to a 
mere "endorsement purporting to convey what nameless others 
think."136 Conversely, opinion character evidence might also be more 
130. See Bennett, supra note 14, at 581. 
131. MD. R. EVID. 5-608(b). 
132. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. Reputation is the total sum of 
how we are known and seen by others. See Taylor v. State, 28 Md. App. 560, 
563 n.3, 346 A.2d 718, 720 n.3 (1975). The reputation of the principal 
witness is based on what the character witness has heard others say about 
the principal witness or what the character witness has discussed with others 
regarding the principal witness. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 
469,477 (1948). In the alternative, a character witness may also testify that 
the principal witness has no reputation, if it is probable that the character 
witness would have heard of any reputation for veracity if it existed. See id. 
at 478 (basing reputation testimony on the assumption that if no ill is re-
ported of one, his or her reputation must be good). 
133. See supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text. 
134. 3 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 36, § 261, at 142-43 (noting that the 
mechanical repetition of a set formula by the reputation witness has been 
seen for what it usually is-a thinly veiled form of personal opinion). 
135. McElhaney, supra note 2, at 62. 
136. 3 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 36, § 261, at 143; see also Mason Ladd, 
Techniques and Theory oj Character Evidence, 24 IOWA L. REv. 498, 511 (1939). 
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prejudicial than reputation evidence,I37 and is more likely to infringe 
on the trier of fact's decision-making process. 13S Nevertheless, opin-
ion evidence is the prominent method of proof. 
C. The Foundation for the Proof of Character 
1. Requiring a Character Witness to Have a Reasonable Basis 
The overall admissibility and weight of character evidence is based 
upon an assumption that the character witness has an adequate foun-
dation to support an opinion or testimony about the principal wit-
ness's reputation. I39 In addition to the previously discussed 
requirements expressly contained in Rule 608 and Maryland Rule 5-
608, both rules require the character witness to support his or her 
testimony with an adequate foundation. 14o 
Requiring an adequate foundation has two components. First, it 
has a prophylactic component that protects a principal witness from 
an unsupported character attack. 141 This part is aimed at convincing 
the trial court. I42 Second, requiring an adequate foundation gives 
weight and credibility to a character witness's testimony.143 This part 
is aimed at convincing the trier of fact. The trial court retains both 
Opinion evidence is often the most trustworthy form of character evidence 
because personal judgment is better than reputation evidence based on the 
hearsay gossip of a community. [d. Moreover, evidence of reputation does 
not necessarily equate to character. [d. at 506 ("[C]haracter is an existent 
quality apart from any reputation ... [c]haracter is what a person actually 
is, while reputation is what his neighbors and those with whom he associ-
ates say he is."). 
137. Ladd, supra note 136, at 510-1l. 
138. See id. at 510 ("[C]haracter is the fact in issue from which other facts may be 
inferred, to permit a witness to express opinion of character would be an 
invasion of the province of the jury."). 
139. See 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 376 (1994). 
140. See supra Part III.C.l.a-b. 
141. See MD. R. EVlD. 5-405 advisory committee's note (acknowledging that it is 
unfair to allow opinions without a proper basis); MD. R. EVlD. 5-608 advisory 
committee's note (finding that a required reasonable basis is a protection 
of Rule 5-608). 
142. Hemingway v. State, 76 Md. App. 127, 134, 543 A.2d 879, 882 (1988) 
("[T]he party who offers the personal opinion of a character witness must 
first convince the trial judge that the witness possesses an adequate basis for 
forming an opinion as to another person's character. H ) (citations omitted). 
143. See id. at 135, 543 A.2d at 882 ("Clearly, the bald conclusion of the [charac-
ter] witness without any reason to support it hardly commends the opinion 
for serious consideration by the trier of fact."). 
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the responsibility to ensure a character witness is qualified to testify, 
and the discretion to control the scope of that testimony.144 
Normally, the trial court will excuse the jury from the courtroom 
before determining whether the character witness is qualified to tes-
tify.145 This qualifying procedure is completed outside the presence 
of the jury to shield the jury from any improper testimony.146 The 
applicable standards for qualifying a character witness depends, in 
part, on the form of the testimony.147 For example, reputation evi-
dence requires that the character witness have contact with the princi-
pal witness's community for a length of time sufficient to become 
aware of the reputation. 148 Similarly, opinion evidence requires the 
character witness to have first-hand knowledge of the principal wit-
144. When analyzing character evidence, the trial court is relied upon to factor 
in all the underlying policies, considerations, and rules. See MCLAIN, supra 
note 6, § 2.104.4, at 69 (discussing the role of the judge on questions of 
admissibility of evidence); see also Durkin v. State, 284 Md. 445, 453, 397 
A.2d 600, 605 (1979) (referring to the trial judge's decision as a "threshold 
function" for the admissibility of character evidence). 
145. The trial court has discretion to determine which preliminary matters 
should be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. FED. R. EVlD. 104(c) 
advisory committee's notes. In Jensen and HeminfSWay, the trial court dis-
missed the jury from the courtroom before qualifying the character wit-
nesses. See infra Part III.C.2.a for a discussion of Jensen. See supra notes 66-
8~ and accompanying text for a discussion of HeminfSWay. 
146. In jury cases, an evidentiary ruling may be made out of the hearing of the 
jury to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury. FED. 
R. EVlD. 103(c). A court ruling excluding evidence is useless if the ex-
cluded evidence ultimately comes before the jury. FED. R. EVlD. 103(c) ad-
visory committee's note (citing Bruton v. United States, 389 U.S. 818 
(1968». 
147. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text. 
148. United States v. Ruiz-Castro, 92 F.3d 1519, 1529-30 (lOth Cir. 1996) (ex-
cluding character witnesses because they did not have sufficient acquain-
tance with the principal witness); United States v. Bedonie, 913 F.2d 782, 
802 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding that a principal witness's reputation for verac-
ity formed by a high school principal over a three year period was admissi-
ble); Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1552 (10th Cir. 
1988) (permitting reputation testimony where character witness was a 
member of community for eleven years and dealt regularly with the princi-
pal witness for two years); United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1381-82 
(11th Cir. 1982) (excluding reputation testimony, in part, because the 
character witness had contact with the witness for only a short time); 
United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1370 (4th Cir. 1979) (allowing rep-
utation testimony to be based on the workplace community). 
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ness,149 however, there is no requirement of a sufficient period of 
acquaintance.150 
This adequate foundation consists of a "reasonable basis" to support 
a character witness's testimony.151 Although both Rule 608 and Mary-
land Rule 5-608 require this foundation, there are slight differences in 
the way this requirement is articulated. Unlike Maryland Rule 5-608, 
Rule 608 makes no express reference to permitting a character witness 
to give a "reasonable basis."152 One commentator recognized the flaw 
that "the Federal Rules of Evidence never even mention what has to 
happen before you can impeach a witness."153 Consequently, we look 
to case law for guidance. 
a. Federal Case Law Establishing the Reasonable Basis Requirement 
In 1979, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 
United States v. Lollar- 54 recognized that although it is more desirable 
for counsel to first ask the character witness about the foundation sup-
porting opinion testimony, Rule 608(a) does not require this founda-
tion. 155 Three years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Watson156 distinguished the requi-
site basis for admitting reputation testimony157 from admitting opin-
149. United States v. Cortez, 935 F.2d 135, 139 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that Rule 
701 limits witness testimony regarding truthfulness to first-hand knowl-
edge); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 7, § 608.13[2] (stating that witness 
testimony based on personal knowledge is a requirement of Rule 701); see 
also FED. R. EVID. 602 (requiring an evidentiary finding that a witness has 
"personal knowledge" of the subject). 
150. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL 
§ 12.03[2], at 12-30 (4th ed. 1999) ("There are no prerequisites of long 
acquaintance ... cross-examination can be expected to expose defects of 
lack of familiarity .... "). 
151. See 3 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 85, § 6.38, at 813-14; MuRPHY, 
supra note 2, § 1302(A), at 495. 
152. Compare FED R. EVID. 608 with MD. R. EVID. 5-608 (a) (3) (B). Maryland Rule 
of Evidence 608(a) (3) (B) states that "a character witness may give a rea-
sonable basis for testimony." MD. R. EVlD. 608(a)(3)(B). Federal Rule 608 
does not contain such a provision. FED R. EVID. 608. 
153. McElhaney, supra note 2, at 62. 
154. 606 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1979). 
155. [d. at 589 (acknowledging that character witnesses may be asked for an 
opinion of the principal witness's character for truthfulness, but Rule 608 
imposes no prerequisite testimony). 
156. 669 F.2d 1374 (11th Cir. 1982). 
157. [d. at 1382 (recognizing that reputation testimony requires the character 
witness to have sufficient acquaintance with the principal witness's commu-
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ion testimony. ISS The court emphasized that Rule 602159 imposed a 
"personal knowledge" requirement on Rule 608 opinion testimony.160 
The court held that the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of 
opinion witnesses who satisfied the personal knowledge 
requirement. 161 
In United States v. Dotson,162 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit further established the requirement of a reasonable 
basis for opinion testimony. The court held that it was error for the 
trial court to allow opinion testimony absent a reasonable basis.163 At 
trial, Frederick Dotson was charged with three counts of receiving fire-
arms.164 In defense, Dotson testified that the firearms were obtained 
prior to his earlier convictions, and he reclaimed the firearms because 
of variolJs threats on his life.165 Dotson offered his own exculpatory 
testimony and the testimony of four principal witnesses.166 In re-
sponse, the government offered the testimony of character witnesses 
to give opinions that "Dotson and one or more of his witnesses were 
not of truthful character" and would lie under oath. 167 The defense 
counsel objected to the government's character witnesses claiming 
that they lacked the proper basis for giving opinion testimony.l68 The 
trial court overruled the objection and allowed the character witnesses 
nity to ensure that the testimony adequately reflects the community assess-
ment) (citing Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 478 (1948». 
158. Id. at 1382 (noting that opinion testimony does not require a long acquain-
tance with the principal witness as a foundation for admissibility). 
159. Rule 602 states in pertinent part, "[a] witness may not testify to a matter 
unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the wit-
ness has personal knowledge of the matter." FED. R. EVID. 602. 
160. Watson, 669 F.2d at 1382. 
161. Id. (noting that the four opinion witnesses were improperly excluded be-
cause the trial court applied the wrong foundational standard for opinion 
testimony). The voir dire of the four witnesses revealed that they had first-
hand knowledge of the principal witness because they worked with him. Id. 
at 1382-83, 1382 n.6. 
162. 799 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1986). 
163. Id. at 193. 
164. Id. at 190 (noting that the charges were related to defendant's past criminal 
history because, "[a]s a result of [Dotson's] status as a convicted felon on 




167. Id. at 190-91 (noting that the government called two FBI agents, a state 
narcotics agent, and an IRS agent to opine as to the truthfulness of Dotson 
and his principal witnesses). 
168. Id. at 191. 
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to testify. 169 Dotson was convicted and sentenced to five years 
imprisonment. 170 
On appeal, the court agreed with Dotson's argument that there was 
no reasonable basis for the opinions of the government's character 
witnesses. 171 The court's analysis distinguished its prior holding in 
United States v. Lollar. 1 72 Recognizing that Rule 701 operated to ensure 
the reliability and relevance of opinion character evidence,173 the 
court held that "[iJn the absence of some underlying basis to demon-
strate that the opinions were more than bare assertions that the defen-
dant and his witnesses were persons not to be believed, the opinion 
evidence should not have been admitted."174 
In later cases, federal appellate courts found the reasoning in Dotson 
persuasive and held that before opinion testimony is admissible the 
character witness must have a reasonable basis. 175 In effect, this case 
law imposed the requirement that a reasonable basis exist to support 
Rule 608 opinion evidence. 176 
169. [d. 
170. [d. 
171. [d. at 193 (declaring that opinion testimony based solely on an investigation 
constitutes an inadequate basis). The court noted one exception: that the 
IRS agent had a reasonable basis for his opinion of Erma Dotson's truthful-
ness based upon a series of interviews, an investigation of her tax returns 
and financial information, and a study of her earlier grand jury testimony. 
[d. 
172. [d. at 191-92 (contrasting that in Lollar the challenge to character evidence 
was to the method of proof, whereas in the instant case, the challenge 
raised an issue on the limits to the introduction of opinion testimony). 
173. Jd. at 192. Federal Rule 701, entitled Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses, 
provides: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness's testimony 
in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions 
or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of 
the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the wit-
ness's testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. 
FED. R. EVlD. 701; acevrd MD. R. EVlD. 5-701. 
174. Dotson, 799 F.2d at 193. 
175. See United States v. McMurray, 20 F.3d 831,834 (8th Cir. 1994) (permitting 
a character witness to testify if there is an adequate showing "that the opin-
ions were more than bare assertions" (quoting Dotson, 799 F.2d at 189»; 
United States v. Cortez, 935 F.2d 135, 139-40 (8th Cir. 1991) (rejecting 
opinion testimony that lacked a sufficiently reliable basis). 
176. See Cindy F. Willard, United States v. Dotson: When Should opinion Testimony 
as to the Truth and Veracity of a Witness be Allowed?, 12 AM. J. TRIAL Aovoc. 
497, 50(H)8 (1988) (discussing the impact of the holding in Dotson on sub-
sequent cases). Willard concluded in her article that as a result of Dotson, 
"[w]hen courts are faced with allowing or disallowing impeaching, opinion 
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b. Expressly Permitting a Reasonable Basis in Maryland 
The pre-rules practice governing the admissibility of character evi-
dence in Maryland was contained in section 9-115 of the Courts and 
Judicial Proceedings Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland. 177 
Courts interpreted section 9-115 as "requiring" a reasonable basis. 178 
When Maryland Rule 5-608 was codified, the drafters expressly in-
cluded subsection (a) (3) (B). This subsection is consistent with the 
federal courts interpretation of the corresponding federal rule,179 and 
expressly states: "on direct examination, a character witness may give a 
reasonable basis for testimony as to reputation or an opinion as to the 
character of the witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness, but may 
not testify to specific instances of truthfulness or untruthfulness by the 
witness."lso Consistent with the pre-rules practice, lSI Maryland Rule 
5-608 was interpreted to "require" a reasonable basis.ls2 
2. What Constitutes a "Reasonable Basis?" 
Once the trial court is satisfied the character witness possesses the 
requisite foundation to testify, the court must still ensure that the 
character witness's testimony, when elicited in the jury's presence, 
complies within the scope of Rule 608 or Maryland Rule 5-608. While 
it is clear that a character witness is required to provide a reasonable 
basis, it is less than certain what that constitutes. 1s3 The authors of the 
testimony, they must determine if the impeaching witness has a substantial 
basis on which to form his opinion." Id. at 510. 
177. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. More specifically, section 9-
115 stated in pertinent part, "no person offered as a character witness who 
has an adequate basis for forming an opinion as to another person's charac-
ter shall hereafter be excluded from giving evidence based on personal 
opinion to prove character. ... " MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &Juo. PROC. § 9-115 
(emphasis added). 
178. See Hemingway v. State, 76 Md. App. 127, 134, 543 A.2d 879, 882 (1988) 
(citing Kelley v. State, 288 Md. 298, 418 A.2d 217 (1980) and Durkin v. 
State, 284 Md. 445, 397 A.2d 600 (1979)). 
179. See supra note 300 and accompanying text. In general, Maryland Rule 5-608 
is a substantial revision of its federal counterpart. See Hornstein, supra note 
52, at 1057. 
180. MD. R. EVID. 5-608 (emphasis added). 
181. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. When admitting character wit-
ness testimony, the courts must apply both Maryland Rule 5-608 and sec-
tion 9-115. SeeJensen v. State, 355 Md. 692,700,736 A.2d 307, 311 (1999). 
182. See infra Part III.C.2.a. 
183. See infra Part III.C.2.a & b; see also United States v. McMurray, 20 F.3d 831, 
834 (8th Cir. 1994) (permitting a character witness to testify who knew the 
character witness through business dealings); Kelley v. State, 288 Md. 298, 
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Federal Rules of Evidence envisioned that a reasonable basis consisted 
of testimony as to the nature and extent of the acquaintance. 184 Simi-
larly, the authors of the Maryland Rules of Evidence envisioned that a 
reasonable basis consisted of testimony covering "such matters as how 
long the witnesses have been acquainted, under what circumstances, 
etc."185 Of course, what the authors envisioned may be quite different 
from a court's interpretation. 
a. Jensen v. State 
In Jensen v. State,186 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the 
trial court erred by restricting a character witness from testifying to 
the full basis for her opinion. 187 On June 17, 1996, on a rural road in 
Virginia, Adrian Pilkington was stabbed two times by the defendant, 
Jason Jensen, and while still alive, placed in the trunk of his car. 188 
302-04, 418 A.2d 217, 219-20 (1980) (stating that there was an insufficient 
basis when basis for opinion was intertwined with results of a polygraph 
test); Durkin v. State, 284 Md. 445, 453-54, 397 A.2d 600, 605 (1979) (stat-
ing that there was an insufficient basis where character witness was police 
chief who had a "brief and limited encounter with the witness"); Wilson v. 
State, 103 Md. App. 722, 726, 654 A.2d 936, 937 (1995) (permitting a char-
acter witness to testify who knew the principal witness for over one year as a 
friend and instructor); Barnes v. State, 57 Md. App. 50, 59, 468 A.2d 1040, 
1044 (1984) (permitting opinion testimony where witness had repeatedly 
interviewed principal witness for over two years); Chadderton v. State, 54 
Md. App. 86, 96, 456 A.2d 1313, 1319 (1983) (excluding opinion testimony 
of a twelve-year old where no basis was proffered besides the witness's in-
ability to remember when he met the principal witness). 
184. The Advisory Committee's Note for Rule 608 states: U[aJs to the use of spe-
cific instances on direct by an opinion witness, see the Advisory Commit-
tee's Note to Rule 405." FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee's note. 
Citing Rule 701, the Advisory Committee's Note in Rule 405 states: 
"[oJpinion testimony on direct ... ought in general to correspond to repu-
tation testimony as now given, i.e., be confined to the nature and extent of 
observation and acquaintance upon which the opinion is based." FED. R. 
EVID. 405 advisory committee's note. 
185. 20 MD. REG. Issue 15 pt. II at P-14 (July 23, 1993); see also MCLAIN, supra 
note 6, § 2.608.4, at 149 ("[AJ 'reasonable basis' for opinion testimony 
would be how long and under what circumstances the character witness 
knows the other witness, e.g., they have worked side by side on the assembly 
line for ten years and they eat lunch together every workday."). 
186. 355 Md. 692, 736 A.2d 307 (1999). 
187. Id. at 708,736 A.2d at 315. The holding was of little significance to jensen's 
conviction because of the finding of harmless error. See infra notes 22M2 
and accompanying text. 
188. Jensen, 355 Md. at 694, 736 A.2d at 308. 
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Jensen drove Pilkington's car accompanied by Brian Wooldridge,Jean 
Nance and Rachel Whitman. The car stopped at a bridge in Freder-
ick, Maryland, where Pilkington was removed from the trunk and 
thrown into the Potomac River.189 On June 21, 1996, Pilkington's 
dead body was removed from the Potomac River a few miles from the 
Route 17 bridge in Brunswick City. 190 Jensen, Wooldridge, Nance and 
Whitman were arrested and tried separately for the murder of 
Pilkington. 191 
At Jensen's trial, the jury was presented with conflicting testimony 
about events occurring the night of Pilkington's death. Wooldridge 
testified on behalf of the State againstJensen,192 and Jensen testified 
to his own exculpatory version of events.193 In response to Wool-
dridge'S testimony, the defense called Melissa Goff as a character wit-
ness to impeach his credibility.194 The defense posed preliminary 
questions to Goff regarding her familiarity with Wooldridge.195 Goff 
testified she knew Wooldridge for over a year, during which time she 
saw him approximately once a week and spoke to him every day.196 
Defense counsel next asked Goff, "[D]o you have an opinion as to 
[Wooldridge's] veracity to tell the truth?"197 At this point, the State 
objected to the question on the grounds of insufficient basis to give an 
opinion. 198 The court dismissed the jury from the courtroom and al-
lowed defense counsel to continue questioning GOff. 199 Goff re-
sponded as to the basis of her opinion: 
189. Id. at 694-95, 736 A.2d at 308. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 695,736 A,2d at 308. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Wooldridge testi-
fied against Jensen in exchange for his guilty plea of conspiracy to commit 
first degree murder with a maximum of fifteen years imprisonment. Id. at 
712,736 A.2d at 317. Wooldridge testified thatJensen delivered the mortal 
stab wound, that Jensen and Nance threw Pilkington's body over the 
bridge, and that during these events he fearfully remained in the car at 
Jensen's threatening command. Id. at 713-14, 736 A,2d at 318-19. 
193. Id. at 695, 736 A,2d at 308. Jensen claimed that he had no intent to harm 
Pilkington, that Wooldridge removed the knife from the trunk, and that he 
feared he was the intended victim of a conspiracy to commit assault and 
murder. Id. at 714-15,736 A,2d at 319. Jensen admitted that he accidentally 
stabbed the victim once in the shoulder acting out of self-defense. 
194. jensen, 355 Md. at 695, 736 A,2d at 308. 
195. Id. at 695-96, 736 A.2d at 308-09. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 697, 736 A.2d at 309. 
198. !d. 
199. Id. 
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A lot of the stories that [Wooldridge] told me didn't add up, 
saying that-one day he would tell me something that hap-
pened on that day and then a couple days later he would tell 
me something else that had happened on that day that 
wouldn't have been able to happen if what he said before 
was true.200 
Goff then stated that this type of exchange with Wooldridge hap-
pened "repeatedly."201 
The court determined that this testimony supported a reasonable 
basis for Goff's opinion and directed the jury to return to the court-
room.202 Once the jury returned, Goff was asked to state her opinion 
regarding Wooldridge's truthfulness.203 She responded, "I think that 
he's a compulsive liar."204 The defense attorney then asked, "What do 
you base that opinion on?"205 Again, the State objected, and the 
judge called a bench conference.206 
The State argued at the bench conference that defense counsel was 
attempting to elicit testimony of specific instances of conduct from 
Goff on direct examination.207 The court agreed with the State's ar-
gument that allowing testimony of specific instances would violate Ma-
ryland Rule 5_608.208 Goff's testimony was restricted to her opinion 
that Wooldridge was a compulsive liar based on her one year relation-
ship with him.209 At the close of the trial, Jensen was found guilty.210 
He appealed the trial court's decision to limit the testimony of 
Goff. 21 1 
On appeal, Jensen complained that "without allowing for some evi-
dence of reasonable basis, a jury 'will not be impressed with a bald 
conclusion of personal opinion. "'212 Jensen argued that if Goff were 
allowed to further explain why she believed that Wooldridge was a 
200. [d. at 697, 736 A.2d at 309. 
201. [d. 
202. [d. 




207. jensen, 355 Md. at 697-98, 736 A.2d at 310. 
208. [d. 
209. [d. 
210. [d. at 698, 736 A.2d at 310. Jensen was convicted of first-degree murder, 
conspiracy to murder, and assault with intent to commit murder. [d. 
211. [d. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court's 
decision, and the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether Goff should have been allowed to give the basis underlying 
her opinion that Wooldridge was a compulsive liar. [d. 
212. [d. (quoting Petitioner jensen's argument on appeal). 
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compulsive liar, the jury would disregard Wooldridge's testimony and 
accord more weight to Jensen's version of events.213 
According to the State, Goff's proffered testimony was properly ex-
cluded by the trial court as "'a number of specific events tied to-
gether' "214 that amounted to specific acts of conduct, which was 
prohibited by Rule 5-608 (b). 215 The State further contended that 
Rule 5-608 "'embodies a restrictive approach designed to avoid divert-
ing the jury's attention and creating mini-trials on the issue of a wit-
ness's credibility,"'216 and that the proper limits of reasonable basis 
testimony consist of "how long and under what circumstances the wit-
nesses have been acquainted."217 Mter reviewing the arguments, the 
court of appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in limit-
ing Goff's testimony.218 
The court of appeals analyzed the content of Goff's statement and 
applied it to the definition of specific instance.219 The court found 
"specific" defined as "of an exact or particular nature," "particular," 
"precise."22o The court concluded that Goff did not testifY to a particu-
lar incident.221 Rather, she testified as a general matter to Wool-
dridge's tendency to tell inconsistent stories.222 The court recognized 
the danger that "once a character witness testifies to a specific in-
stance" of the principal witness's conduct, "the jury's focus necessarily 
turns to whether in fact that particular event occurred .... "223 The 
court found, however, that danger was nonexistent in the instant case. 
Contrasting the effect of Goff's statement to the effect of specific in-
stance testimony, the court concluded that Goff's testimony "would 
not serve to distract and confuse the jury, nor would it consume time 
213. [d. 
214. [d. (quoting Respondent State's argument on appeal). 
215. [d. 
216. [d. (quoting Respondent State's argument on appeal). 
217. [d. 
218. [d. at 708-09,736 A.2d at 315-16 (affirming the trial court's conviction upon 
a finding that the improper restriction of Goff's testimony was harmless error 
because even assuming the trier of fact found Wooldridge's testimony un-
truthful, the remainder of the State's evidence proved Jensen's guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt). 
219. jensen, 355 Md. at 699-700, 736 A.2d at 310-11. 
220. [d. at 699, 736 A.2d at 310 (citing BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1398 (6th ed. 
1990)). 
221. [d. 
222. [d. at 699, 736 A.2d at 311. 
223. [d. at 699-700, 736 A.2d at 311 (referencing the relationship of Maryland 
Rule 5-608 (a) (3) (B) to Rules 608(b) and 405(b) to highlight the dangers 
of specific instances). 
156 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 30 
by altering the focus of the trial to other particular events."224 Finally, 
the court found that Goff's proffered testimony was permissible be-
cause "a character witness [is] entitled to some latitude in informing 
the jury as to the basis for an opinion .... "225 
Next, the court analyzed whether the trial court abused its discre-
tion in limiting Goff's testimony.226 To answer this question, the court 
addressed section 9-115 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article 
and Maryland Rule 5-608.227 The court defined the phrase "reasona-
ble basis for testimony" in light of the law at the time Maryland Rule 5-
608(a) (3) was adopted.228 
The court recognized that the 1971 enactment of section 9-115 ab-
rogated the common law.229 Section 9-115 was broadly interpreted 
and applied by the Maryland courts in Durkin v. State,230 Kelley v. 
State,231 and Hemingway v. State. 232 
In addition, the court reviewed the legislative history of Maryland 
Rule 5-608 and determined that the final draft was a compromise be-
tween expressly overruling the admissibility of specific instances on 
direct examination and a broadening of Maryland Rule 5-608 beyond 
the scope of Rule 608.233 The court found "a strong indication" that 
the 1994 court of appeals intended that Maryland Rule 5-608 exceed 
Rule 608 in what was allowed before the trier of fact as the basis for an 
224. Id. at 700, 736 A.2d at 31l. 




229. Id. at 701, 736 A.2d at 311-12. 
230. 284 Md. 445, 453, 397 A.2d 600, 605 (1979). Here the court emphasized 
that section 9-115 permitted the reasonable basis for the personal opinion 
of character to be presented for the trier of fact's consideration along with 
the bare opinion. Id.; see also jensen, 355 Md. at 702, 736 A.2d at 312. 
23l. 288 Md. 298, 302, 418 A.2d 217,219 (1980) (asserting that "[9-115] permits 
the admission of a broad range of testimony which may aid the jury in as-
sessing the credibility of a witness"); see also jensen, 355 Md. at 702, 736 A.2d 
at 312. 
232. 76 Md. App. 127, 133-35,543 A.2d 879, 882 (1988) (noting that the court 
went so far as to admit specific instances of conduct to impeach a witness's 
credibility on direct examination under section 9-115). Since then jensen 
has overruled Hemingway. See jensen, 355 Md. at 724, 736 A.2d at 324. 
233. jensen, 355 Md. at 707-08,736 A.2d at 315. In 1988, the first proposed draft 
of Maryland Rule 5-608 mirrored Federal Rule 608 in language and sub-
stance but was not reported to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Instead, a 
second draft, which added section (a) (3) (B) expressly permitting a reason-
able basis, was reported and adopted as Maryland Rule 5-608. See id. at 704-
05, 736 A.2d at 313-14. 
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opinion.234 The court recognized that Federal Rule 405 confines the 
permissible basis for supporting opinion testimony under Rule 608 to 
the nature and extent of observation and acquaintance.235 The court 
found, however, that the Federal Rule 405 standard was not a limit on 
Maryland Rule 5-608 because of the intent of Maryland Rule 5-608 to 
extend beyond Rule 608.236 
The court also distinguished Rule 608 from Maryland Rule 5-608 
based upon the language in the text and also the reporters' notes.237 
First, the text in Maryland Rule 5-608 differed from that used in Rule 
608 because where Rule 608 is silent, Maryland Rule 5-608 expressly 
allows the character witness to give a reasonable basis for an opin-
ion.238 Second, the content of the respective reporters' notes dif-
fered. 239 The court found that the Federal Reporter's notes were 
restrictive, while the Maryland language was illustrative.240 These dif-
ferences further supported a finding of intent to distinguish the two 
rules. 
Mter reviewing the history and language of Maryland Rule 5-608, 
the court concluded that a character witness should be allowed lati-
tude to offer something to the jury beyond a bare conclusion that the 
witness is or is not a truthful person, but should not offer specific 
instances of conduct.241 The court held that a character witness's tes-
timony supporting a "reasonable basis" is not restricted only to the 
length and manner of acquaintance with the principal witness.242 
Judge Chasanow concurred with the majority's affirmance of Jen-
sen's conviction, but dissented with finding error in the trial court's 
restriction on Goff's reasonable basis testimony.243 Judge Chasanow 





239. Jensen, 355 Md. at 706-07, 736 A.2d at 314. 
240. Id. at 708 n.6, 763 A.2d at 315-16 n.6 (making the distinction that the Fed-
eral Rule Advisory Committee provided that opinion testimony ought in 
general to be confined to the nature and extent of observation and acquain-
tance, as opposed to the Maryland Rule Reporter's Note, which envisioned 
that reasonable basis cover such matters as how long and under what 
circumstances) . 
241. Id. at 708,736 A.2d at 315 (recognizing that it is fair to infer from Maryland 
Rule 5-608 and its history that a character witness can give meaningful opin-
ion testimony). 
242. Id. at 707, 736 A.2d at 315. 
243. Id. at 722-23, 736 A.2d at 323 (Chasanow,j., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). 
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argued that the majority's holding allowed character witness testi-
mony that improperly exceeded the scope of Maryland Rule 5_608.244 
He opined that the trial court had not abused its discretion by limiting 
Goff's testimony.245 Judge Chasanow advocated a strict interpretation 
of Maryland Rule 5-608, emphasizing that the adoption of Maryland 
Rule 5-608 overruled Hemingway v. State.246 He pointed out that the 
m~ority failed to recognize a vital distinction in the application of 
Maryland Rule 5-608 (a) (3)(B) that, "[i]t is quite clear that the rule is 
intended to allow the character witness to express the reasonable basis 
for arriving at an opinion, not the reasonable basis for the opinion 
arrived at."247 This position supports a more restrictive approach to 
the admissibility of character evidence.248 
b. United States v. Murray 
In United States v. Murray,249 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit was faced with the same challenge of defining the 
scope of what constitutes a reasonable basis. Michael Murray was 
charged with the murder of Juan Carlos Bacallo and conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine.250 The government called Richard Brown as a 
244. Id. at 725-26, 736 A.2d at 325 (applying a strict interpretation of "reasona-
ble basis" that limits testimony to "how long and under what circumstances 
the character witness knew the primary witness, or how often and under 
what circumstances the character witness discussed the reputation of the 
primary witness"). 
245. Id. at 725-26, 736 A.2d at 325 (finding that Goff's testimony was more simi-
lar to specific instances of conduct than a reasonable basis for an opinion, 
and, therefore, was properly excluded by the trial court pursuant to Mary-
land Rule 5-608(b)). 
246. Id. at 724-25,736 A.2d at 324 (quoting LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND RULES OF 
EVIDENCE § 2.608.4 at 149 (West 1994) (citing Hemingway v. State, 76 Md. 
App. 127,543 A.2d 879 (1988))). 
247. Id. at 724,736 A.2d at 324. Judge Chasanow also condemned the usage of 
the nomenclature "compulsive liar" to describe the principal witness's char-
acter for veracity. Id. at 723, 736 A.2d at 323 (arguing that "compulsive" 
was inappropriate because it added an indication of psychological defect, 
because there is an obvious difference between an untruthful person and a 
person who has an uncontrollable compulsion to lie). 
248. Id. at 723, 736 A.2d at 323. Judge Chasanow recognized that the trier of 
fact has a brief opportunity to observe a witness and little basis for making 
critical judgments about a witness's veracity. To alleviate the trier of fact's 
dilemma without violating the rights of a witness, the evidence should be 
presented in a manner that minimizes its inflammatory nature. Id. 
249. 103 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 1997). 
250. Id. at 313. 
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principal witness to testify against Murray.251 Brown was vigorously 
cross-examined by the defense, which was considered by the court as 
an attack on Brown's credibility.252 In response, the government of-
fered Lieutenant Goshert as a character witness to rehabilitate 
Brown's character.253 Goshert testified that in his opinion Brown was 
"extremely reliable."254 Additionally, Goshert testified that based on 
Brown's help as an informant, the police department had "made" in 
"excess of sixty-five" cases and obtained search warrants "numerous 
times."255 The defense argued that Goshert's testimony violated Rule 
608(b) because it was extrinsic evidence of Brown's character for 
truthfulness.256 The trial court found that Goshert's testimony was 
proper, thereby constituting a reasonable basis supporting his opin-
ion.257 Murray was convicted on all counts and sentenced to life in 
prison.258 
On appeal, Murray argued that Goshert's testimony was improperly 
admitted into evidence.259 The government argued that Goshert's tes-
timony was proper as supporting a reasonable basis for his opinion.260 
The Third Circuit held that admitting Goshert's entire testimony was 
error in violation of Rule 608(b).261 The court dissected Goshert's 
251. [d. at 314. Brown, a taxi-cab driver, picked up Murray on the night of the 
murder. [d. Brown testified that, after Murray and the victim walked away 
from the cab, he heard gunshots and he saw Murray return to the cab with 
a pistol. [d. Brown further testified that he was told by Murray "that is what 
someone gets for being in violation," but he never saw the victim return to 
the cab. [d. 
252. [d. at 321 (eliciting from Brown, on cross-examination, an admission of his 
past involvement in various illegal activities). 
253. Murray, 103 F.3d at 321. 
254. [d. (noting this reliability in terms of accuracy of the information Brown 




258. [d. at 316. 
259. [d. at 321 (arguing that Goshert's testimony that Brown had "made" cases 
for the police department was an improper quantification constituting spe-
cific instances of Brown's conduct). 
260. [d. The government argued that: 
[d. 
[T]here has got to be some basis for the jury to know [Goshert] 
can give that opinion as to [Brown's] reputation. And by letting 
the jury know they have a close working relationship over a period 
of time and that they have been involved in all of these incidents, 
then there is a basis for him giving that opinion. 
261. [d. (recognizing that extrinsic evidence of specific instances of a principal 
witness's conduct as proof of truthfulness violates Rule 608(b». 
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testimony, separating the admissible from inadmissible portions.262 
The court explained that Goshert's testimony regarding the police use 
of Brown as a confidential informant on "numerous occasions" since 
1988 was admissible to establish a reasonable basis for his opinion as 
to Brown's character for truthfulness.263 The portion of Goshert's tes-
timony that Brown had "made" sixty-five cases, however, was inadmis-
sible because it was more specific than can be justified as necessary to 
establish a foundation.264 The court found that the error was not 
harmless and remanded the case with instructions that the court 
should limit Goshert's testimony.265 
The Murray court relied in part on the reasoning used by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to decide a simi-
lar issue.266 In United States v. Taylor,267 a police.informant, Tony Phil-
lips, testified as a principal witness against the defendant, Henry 
Taylor, who was charged and convicted of possession and intent to 
distribute an illegal substance.268 The government introduced the tes-
timony of Officer Black to support the credibility of Phillips.269 Black 
testified that Phillips had acted as a buyer for the government on fIf-
teen to eighteen drug buys, and that Phillips had given reliable infor-
mation and testimony that resulted in the guilty pleas and convictions 
of drug sellers.27o The jury returned a guilty verdict, which Taylor 
appealed.271 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that Black's testimony was improper as extrinsic evidence 
used to bolster the credibility of Phillips.272 The court vacated the 




265. [d. at 322 (emphasizing that the government's case depended largely on 
the testimony of an informant, which created the need for a character wit-
ness to testify as to the informant's reliability). 
266. [d. 
267. 900 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1990). 




271. [d. at 781. 
272. [d. (citing Rule 608(b) as prohibiting a character witness from testifying on 
direct examination to specific instances of the principal witness's conduct 
for the purpose of supporting the principal's credibility). 
273. [d. at 782-83 (emphasizing that Phillips was central to the government's 
case, and, therefore, improper bolstering of Phillips' testimony could have 
been quite prejudicial to the defendant). 
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IV. UNDERMINING THE EFFICACY OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE: 
WHEN DOES A REASONABLE BASIS BECOME A SPECIFIC 
INSTANCE OF CONDUCT? 
A. The Importance of Distinguishing Reasonable Basis from Specific In-
stances of Conduct 
The dangers underlying character evidence are most apparent 
when a character witness testifies about specific instances of a princi-
pal witness's conduct.274 When determining if a reasonable basis ex-
ists, the court must then distinguish admissible testimony constituting 
a reasonable basis from inadmissible testimony of specific instances of 
conduct. 275 
Recently, both the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Jensen, and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Murray, have 
been challenged by this distinction.276 In both Jensen and Murray, the 
sponsor of a character witness argued that the jury was unable to ap-
preciate or properly weigh the opinion of the character witness with-
out hearing a basis for the opinion, and therefore, the character 
witness should be entitled to give testimony beyond a mere 
opinion.277 
274. For general damages see supra Part lILA and accompanying text. For the 
proliferation of dangers when evidence take the form of specific instapces 
of conduct, see supra note 125 and accompanying text. As a result of the 
fear of permitting specific instances of conduct as a method of proof, it has 
been suggested that there be a total ban on the use of specific instances of 
conduct to prove credibility of a witness; therefore, testimony of specific 
instances of conduct should be inadmissible on both direct and cross exam-
ination. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE 461 (2d 
ed. 19S6); see also MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 4S, at IS2 (recommending 
"a blanket prohibition upon cross-examination as to specific acts of the 
principal witness"). Some jurisdictions have responded to this fear by draft-
ing rules of evidence that expressly exclude specific acts of conduct as a 
method of proof. See supra note 58-59 and accompanying text. 
275. See GRAHAM, supra note 274, § 60S.3 n.5 (1999 Supp.) ("Sometimes the line 
between properly establishing an adequate basis for character witness testi-
mony in the form of an opinion and the improper introduction of extrinsic 
evidence may be difficult to locate."); see also WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra 
note 7, § 60S.21, §§ 608-44 to 608-45 ("[T]his Rule [60S(b)] has also been 
applied to prevent testimony about specific instances of conduct on the 
direct examination of a character witness in the guise of qualifying the wit-
ness by showing the basis for his or her knowledge of the person's 
character.") . 
276. See United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 321 (3d Cir. 1997); Jensen v. 
State, 355 Md. 692, 700, 736 A.2d 307, 31l (1999). 
277. Murray, 103 F.3d at 322; Jensen, 355 Md. at 70S, 736 A.2d at 315. 
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In Murray, the Third Circuit correctly determined that the reasona-
ble basis should have been limited to: (1) the nature of the acquain-
tance-the principal witness was an informant for the character 
witness; and (2) the extent of the acquaintance-the principal witness 
had worked for the character witness on numerous occasions since 
1988.278 This distinction by the Murray court provided the jury with 
more than a bare opinion, yet was properly limited to the nature and 
extent of acquaintance. . 
When faced with a similar challenge in Jensen, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland concluded that the trial court erred by restricting the rea-
sonable basis testimony to the nature and extent of acquaintance. At 
trial, when the character witness was asked to give her opinion, she 
had already testified to: (1) the length of acquaintance-that she 
knew the principal witness for over one year; and (2) the circum-
stances of the acquaintance-she saw the principal witness approxi-
mately once a week and spoke to him almost daily.279 This limitation 
by the trial court was not error because it was consistent with Maryland 
Rule 5-608 and the federal practice. 
B. Where the Jensen Court Went Wrong 
The interpretation of what constitutes a reasonable basis in Mary-
land diverges from the federal practice.280 The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland explained this divergence by asserting that the Maryland 
practice was intended to "go beyond" the federal practice.281 This is a 
dangerous and unsupported assertion. 
In 1993, Judge Chasanow, joined by Judge Bell, filed a partial dis-
senting opinion to the codification of the Maryland Rules of Evi-
dence.282 Judge Chasanow warned of the potential pitfalls resulting 
from redrafting and modifying over 80% of the Federal Rules.283 He 
opined, "[a] ttempting to clarify but not change the substance of a spe-
cific Federal Rule, by rewriting the rule, may create, rather than allevi-
278. Murray, 103 F.3d at 322. 
279. jensen, 355 Md. at 708, 736 A.2d at 315. 
280. See supra Part III.C.2.b. 
281. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text. 
282. MARYLAND RULES, Maryland Rules Orders, at p. 33 (Michie 2000) (Chasanow, 
J., Partial Dissenting Opinion). 
283. [d. Judge Chasanow observed that "[i]n disregard of the common sense 
maxim, 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it,' the Rules Committee recommended, 
and [the Court of Appeals of Maryland] adopted, rules patterned after the 
Federal Rules, but which alter the language in over four-fifths of the Fed-
eral Rules." [d. 
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ate, confusion."284 This statement foreshadowed the conflict present 
in Jensen. 
It is indisputable that the language adopted in Maryland Rule 5-608 
is different from that used in Rule 608. Further analysis indicates that 
the language of Maryland Rule 5-608 is unique from that used in any 
other state rule on character evidence, however, the mere fact that, on 
its face, Maryland Rule 5-608 is different does not justify expanding 
the substance of the rule. 
In Jensen, the majority of the court of appeals relied primarily on the 
history of Maryland Rule 5-608 to support its holding.285 The court 
placed great weight on the Reporter's Note statement that Maryland 
Rule 5-608 "goes beyond the Federal Rule somewhat by providing that 
on direct examination, a character witness may give a 'reasonable ba-
sis' for testimony as to reputation or an opinion as to truthfulness of 
the previous witness."286 The court interpreted the phrase "goes be-
yond" as an indicator that the drafters of Maryland Rule 5-608 in-
tended to allow a reasonable basis to contain more substance than 
that allowed under its federal counterpart.287 This assertion is unsup-
ported because the true intent of the language used in Maryland Rule 
5-608 (a)(3)(B) was for clarification purposes, not substantive 
purposes.288 
In a letter from the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Rules 
of Practice and Procedure ("the Committee") to the court of appeals, 
Judge Wilner explained three scenarios relevant to the drafting of the 
Maryland Rules of Evidence.289 First, where the current Maryland 
practice and law were consistent with the federal rule and the federal 
rule was unambiguous, the Committee recommended the same lan-
guage as the federal rule.290 Second, where the current Maryland 
practice and law were different from the federal rule, the Committee 
recommended changes consistent with Maryland practice and law.291 
Finally, where the current Maryland practice and law was consistent 
with the federal rule but the federal rule was ambiguous, the Commit-
284. Id. 
285. Jensen v. State, 355 Md. 692, 704-09,736 A.2d 307, 313-16 (1999). 
286. Id. at 70{H)7, 736 A.2d at 314 (citing 20 MD. REG. Issue 15 pt. II at P-14 (July 
23,1993». 
287. Id. at 707, 736 A.2d at 315. 
288. See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text. 
289. 20 MD. REG. issue 15 pt. II at P-l (July 23, 1993). 
290. Id. 
291. Id. 
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tee recommended new language.292 As applied to Maryland Rule 5-
608, the latter of these three circumstances was present.293 
The authors of Maryland Rule 5-608 codified the substance of Rule 
608, but modified the style, language and organization.294 These 
modifications should not be read to broaden the substance of Rule 
608. The Reporter's Note explained that, in 1988, the Maryland Rules 
of Evidence Committee ("Rules Committee") conducted considerable 
debate as to the meaning of Rule 608.295 As a result of the three-year 
drafting process, the Rules Committee developed a proposal that "at-
tempts to separate the 'apples' from the 'oranges' in [Federal Rule] 
608 to make explicit what is implicit in that Rule."296 
There is an implicit understanding that, pursuant to Rule 608, opin-
ion testimony is only admissible if based on a reasonable basis. Al-
though Rule 608 is silent on this point, the Advisory Committee's 
Note for Rule 608 refers to the Advisory Committee's Note for Rule 
405 for guidance.297 At the time of drafting Maryland Rule 5-608, the 
federal interpretation of Rule 608(a) required a reasonable basis for 
supporting opinion testimony.298 The Rules Committee drafting Ma-
ryland Rule 5-608 (a) (3)(B) was cognizant of, and made explicit, the 
implicit federal practice.299 The Commentary to Maryland Rule 5-608 
also recognized that, "[s]ubsection (a) (3) (B) is consistent with the 
reading that the federal courts have given to the federal rule."30o Ac-
292. [d. Judge Wilner wrote: 
[d. 
In some cases, the Committee opted for the substance of the Fed-
eral rule but found the rule, as written, to be unclear or mislead-
ing, and in those instances it adopted style changes to the Federal 
rule to bring the text in closer conformity with how the courts have 
construed the rule. 
293. See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text. 
294. See STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACI'ICE AND PROCEDURE NOTES 
(Feb. 12, 1993) (Maryland Rule 5-608 "is substantially the same as the fed-
eral statute but has been rewritten and reorganized to enhance clarity"); 
STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACI'ICE AND PROCEDURE NOTES Gan. 8, 
1993) (Maryland Rule 5-608 "is based on the federal rule but has been to-
tally rewritten for clarity"). 
295. 20 MD. REG. issue 15 pt. II at P-14 Guly 23, 1993). 
296. [d. (emphasis added). 
297. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
298. See supra Part III.C.l.a. 
299. See 20 MD. REG. issue 15 pt. II at P-9 Guly 23, 1993) ("Typically, under [ ] 
Federal Rule [405], the court makes an initial determination whether the 
witness has a sufficient basis on which to have formed an opinion of the 
subject'S character, in accordance with Rule 104(a)."). 
300. MCLAIN, supra note 6, § 2.608.3, at 148. 
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cordingly, the Rules Committee was aware of and acquiesced in the 
federal practice of requiring a reasonable basis to support opinion 
testimony. Considering this recognition, it is troublesome that the Jen-
sen court expanded the substance of Maryland Rule 5-608. 
Prior to the codification of Maryland Rule 5-608, the Maryland prac-
tice and law permitted a character witness to give a reasonable basis 
for an opinion on direct examination.30l In Durkin v. State,302 the 
court found that the admissibility of an opinion "should be limited to 
the situation where the opinion was relevant and had a sufficient ba-
sis." In fact, the Maryland practice and law required a reasonable ba-
sis.303 Subsequently, in Hemingway v. State,304 the court broadened 
this practice to permit a character witness to testify to specific in-
stances of conduct as a reasonable basis.305 The Rules Committee was 
aware of these implications when codifYing the Maryland Rules of 
Evidence.306 
The Jensen court erred in finding no indication that the "reasonable 
basis" was to be restricted to the length and manner of acquaintance 
between the character witness and principal witness.307 When analyz-
ing the language used in the Reporter's Note of Maryland Rule 5-608, 
the court recognized that the language "goes beyond" is contradictory 
with the subsequent assertion that "[ t] he Committee envisions 'rea-
sonable basis' evidence as covering such matters as how long the wit-
nesses have been acquainted, under what circumstances, etc.," 
because the later provision seems to mirror Rule 608.308 The court 
resolved the apparent inconsistency by ignoring the phrase "covering 
such matters as" and relying on the phrase "goes beyond."309 This is 
the incorrect outcome when reconciling the two phrases. Because the 
301. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text. 
302. 284 Md. 445, 453, 397 A.2d 600, 605 (1979). 
303. [d. The court explained further, "it is clear from the language and legisla-
tive history of § 9-115 that the extent of the basis for the personal opinion 
character testimony relates to admissibility, and not just to the weight to be 
given the testimony by the trier of fact." [d. 
304. 76 Md. App. 127, 543 A.2d 879 (1988). 
305. [d. at 136-37, 543 A.2d at 883 (allowing specific records of a witness's violent 
acts to be admissible as a basis for an opinion). 
306. See 20 MD. REG. issue 15 pt. II at P-14 (July 23, 1993) (acknowledging that 
the second sentence of Maryland Rule 5-608 (a) (3) is inconsistent with Hem-
ingway); 20 MD. REG. issue 15 pt. II at P-9 (July 23, 1993) ("The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland has not spoken on the question but it is unlikely that 
Hemingway could survive adoption of [ ] proposed Rule [405]."). 
307. See Jensen v. State, 355 Md. 692, 706, 736 A.2d 307,314 (1999). 
308. [d. at 708 n.6, 736 A.2d at 315 n.6. 
309. [d. 
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Reporter's Note does not define either what "goes beyond" means or 
how far "beyond" Rule 608 is permissible, but does define the matters 
covered by reasonable basis, more weight should be given to the con-
crete examples, namely, how long the witnesses have been acquainted 
and under what circumstances. 
The finding that a reasonable basis is not restricted by the length 
and manner of acquaintance blatantly disregards the Maryland Re-
porter's Note statement that reasonable basis evidence covers such 
matters as "how long the witnesses have been acquainted, under what 
circumstances, etc."310 Although the term "etc." does not restrict a 
reasonable basis to consist of only "how long" and "under what cir-
cumstances," the term does restrict a reasonable basis to categories 
similar to the preceding phrases.311 A canon of statutory interpreta-
tion, ejusdem generis, provides that where the general term ("etc."), fol-
lows the specific terms ("how long" and "under what circumstances"), 
the general is limited to the nature of the specific. This limitation, 
therefore, is a restriction on the content of reasonable basis testimony. 
The Rules Committee clearly intended to abandon the practice in 
Hemingway,312 however, the Jensen majority relied on the allegedly 
broad interpretation of section 9-115 in Durkin v. State, Kelley v. State 
and Hemingway v. State. 313 Although the court properly recognized 
that Maryland Rule 5-608 "unquestionably intended to modify Mary-
land law, in particular, Hemingway v. State . .. to the extent that spe-
cific instances of truthfulness or untruthfulness were not admissible 
on direct examination of a witness,"314 the court found "no indication 
that the Rule intended to restrict the latitude previously given to char-
acter witnesses in testifying as to the reasons underlying their opin-
ions."315 The cases that the Jensen majority relied upon must be 
placed into context. The courts in Durkin and Kelley were interpreting 
section 9-115, which had recently abrogated the common law byad-
mitting character evidence in the form of opinion testimony and per-
310. 20 MD. REG. issue 15 pt. II at P-14 (July 23, 1993). 
311. Et cetra is defined and explained as "after reciting the initiatory words of a 
set formula ... etc. is added ... for the sake of convenience. And other 
things of like kind or purpose as compared with those immediately thereto-
fore mentioned." BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 553 (6th ed. 1990). 
312. The holding in Hemingway is irreconcilable with the codification of Mary-
land Rules 5-405 and 5-608. Compare Hemingway v. State, 76 Md. App. 127, 
134-36, 543 A.2d 879, 882-83 (1988) with MD. R. EVID. 5-405, 5-608. See 
supra note 306. 
313. See jensen, 355 Md. at 701-03, 736 A.2d at 312-13; see also supra notes 229-32 
and accompanying text. 
314. jensen, 355 Md. at 706, 736 A.2d at 314. 
315. [d. 
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mitting a reasonable basis.316 The focus of the court in those cases 
was separating character testimony that was sufficient for a reasonable 
basis, and admissible, from testimony that was insufficient, and inad-
missible.317 At the time of the decisions, the court was broadening 
character witness testimony by admitting opinion testimony only if 
supported by a sufficient reasonable basis. The courts were requiring 
a reasonable basis rather than permitting a wide range of testimony. 
Specifically, the Durkin court was challenged by the distinction be-
tween a narrow interpretation of section 9-115, where the reasonable 
basis relates to the weight of the evidence,318 and a broad interpreta-
tion, where the reasonable basis relates to admissibility and the weight 
of the evidence.319 The legislative history of section 9-115 revealed 
concern that without a reasonable basis, opinion testimony might be 
too freely admitted into evidence.32o The impetus for the amended 
"adequate basis" language to section 9-115 was a desire to limit the 
admissibility of opinion testimony to situations where it was relevant 
and had a sufficient basis.321 The Durkin court only addressed 
whether a trial court could exclude opinion testimony for lack of a 
reasonable basis; the court did not address the permissible scope of 
reasonable testimony.322 
In Kelley v. State,323 the issue on appeal centered upon a determina-
tion of what was sufficient for a reasonable basis.324 The Jensen court 
relied upon the assertion in Kelley that section 9-115 "permits the ad-
316. See Kelley v. State, 288 Md. 298, 299, 418 A.2d 217,219 (1980) ("The start-
ing point for our analysis is Maryland Code (1974, 1979 Cum. Supp.), § 9-
llS."); Durkin v. State, 284 Md. 445, 448, 397 A.2d 600, 602 (1979) ("The 
issue in this case centers upon § 9-llS."). 
317. See Kelley, 288 Md. at 302-03, 418 A.2d at 219; Durkin, 284 Md. at 4S3, 397 
A.2d at 60S. 
318. Durkin, 284 Md. at 4S2, 397 A.2d at 604. The defendant argued that section 
9-llS required a character witness to give an opinion with some basis in 
personal experience where the sufficiency of the basis for the opinion goes 
to the weight of the evidence, not to the admissibility of the evidence. Id. 
319. [d. (basing the admissibility of character evidence on the court's determina-
tion that the character witness has a proper foundation). 
320. [d. at 4S3, 397 A.2d at 604-0S. 
321. [d. 
322. [d. at 4S4 (affirming the trial court's refusal to admit opinion testimony 
based on an unclear and unproved assertion that the principal witness filed 
a false police report). 
323. 288 Md. 298,418 A.2d 217 (1980). 
324. Kelley, 288 Md. 298, 304, 418 A.2d 217, 220 ("Since the character testimony 
was based, at least, in part on the polygraph test, we conclude that its basis 
was inadequate and it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to admit 
it.") . 
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mission of a broad range of testimony which may aid the jury in assess-
ing the credibility of a witness."325 The remainder of the assertion in 
Kelley, however, goes on to state that "such testimony must not be used 
as a subterfuge to indirectly convey evidence which is otherwise inad-
missible."326 The Jensen court should have relied on the second part 
of the assertion. Instead, as a result of Jensen, a character witness may 
do exactly what the Kelley court warned against: use reasonable basis 
testimony as a "subterfuge" to testifY to the basis for the opinion. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As previously discussed, the history of using character witness testi-
mony to impeach or rehabilitate a principal witness's character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness reveals that the rules of evidence oper-
ate to limit the dangers of character evidence.327 One such limitation 
is the prohibition of character witness testimony about specific in-
stances of a principal witness's conduct on direct examination.328 Re-
cently, the strictures of the prohibition have been tested and 
challenged through the presentation of "reasonable basis" testimony 
used to support a character witness's opinion.329 
When distinguishing between "reasonable basis" testimony and tes-
timony constituting specific instances of conduct, the court of appeals 
holding in Jensen went too far. 330 Permitting the character witness to 
go beyond "how long" and "under what circumstances" the character 
witness knows the principal witness creates the likelihood that the ad-
ditional information takes the form of specific instances of conduct.331 
The court created a state of uncertainty by failing to define exactly the 
parameters of the character witness's testimony and how far beyond 
those parameters the testimony may go before it is inadmissible as spe-
325. Jensen v. State, 355 Md. 692, 702, 736 A.2d 307,312 (1999) (quoting Kelley 
v. State, 288 Md. 298, 302, 418 A.2d 217, 219 (1980)). 
326. Kelley, 288 Md. at 301,418 A.2d at 219. 
327. See supra Part II & III. 
328. See supra Part III.B.3. 
329. See supra Part I1I.C.2.a & b. 
330. Interview with Professor Lynn McLain, Professor of Law at University of 
Baltimore School of Law in Baltimore, Md. (Nov. 12,1999). Professor Mc-
Lain expressed concern over the Court of Appeals of Maryland's holding in 
Jensen. Id. As the Special Reporter for the 1994 Maryland Rules of Evi-
dence, Professor McLain opined that the intent of promulgating Maryland 
Rule 5-608 was to avoid the admissibility of specific acts of conduct on di-
rect examination of a character witness. Id. According to Professor Mc-
Lain, Judge Chasanow's dissent more effectively captured the intended 
practice of admitting character witness testimony in Maryland. Id. 
331. See supra Part I1I.C.2.a. 
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cific instances of conduct.332 By allowing a character witness to give a 
reasonable basis that goes beyond the length and manner of acquain-
tance, the Maryland practice strays from the majority.333 When given 
the opportunity to address the issue again, a more restrictive ap-
proach to character witness testimony is appropriate given Maryland 
Rule 5-608's history and should be adopted by the court. 
Michael P. O'Day 
332. See supra Part III.C.2.a. 
333. See supra Part IV.B. 
